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Abstract At the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference, the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
disagreed on whether to launch negotiations on multilateral disciplines concerning the four areas of government
policy collectively known as the ‘Singapore issues’. This amounted to a decision not to expand the WTO’s
boundaries along these dimensions. In this paper, five hypotheses concerning the treatment of the Singapore
issues by the WTO’s membership are described and assessed. The implications of this assessment for the
likelihood that, at some future date, similar proposals can be successfully advanced in the multilateral trade
arena are also discussed.
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I. Introduction
In many respects the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations has been curious. WTO
members responded to acute geopolitical circumstances in the second half of 2001 and in an
act of international solidarity launched the Doha Round. At that time WTO members were
prepared to set an end date for the negotiations but not to finalize the contents of the negotiating
agenda, effectively leaving undefined the potential negotiating trade-offs. Furthermore, the
shadow of the past—not just in terms of the so-called ‘built-in agenda’, but also the concerns
of some about the costs of implementing the Uruguay Round commitments—loomed heavily
over the subsequent deliberations.
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One of the decisions that WTO members took collectively during the Doha Round was
not to launch negotiations on three of the four so-called ‘Singapore issues’ (specifically,
provisions relating to the interaction between trade and investment, the interaction between
trade and competition policy, and transparency in government procurement practices).
Moreover, WTO members decided not to undertake any further work on these three subjects
for the duration of the Doha Round. In the so-called ‘July 2004 package’, WTO members
also decided to launch negotiations on further trade facilitation measures. These decisions
were taken just under a year after the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference collapsed in acrimony.
Together, this Ministerial Conference and the July 2004 package formally sealed the fate of
the Singapore issues in the Doha Round.
In this paper I examine the factors responsible for the fate of the Singapore issues in the
early years of the Doha Round, bearing in mind that even the proposals to launch negotiations
on trade facilitation were initially rejected by the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group of
developing countries (the ACP countries) at the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference. I do not
propose to examine here the relative merits of the various proposals for further multilateral
disciplines on the Singapore issues; some former colleagues and I have already done so in
considerable detail (see the chapters of SECO and Evenett (2003)). Nor do I propose to offer a
blow-by-blow account of the run-up to and the events at the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference.1
Instead, I describe and evaluate five hypotheses concerning the Singapore issues’ fate in
the early years of the Doha Round. One hypothesis, namely that the WTO was the wrong
institution to house these additional multilateral disciplines, is given particular attention.
In doing so, I consider the small literature on the scope and boundaries of the WTO.
This literature seeks to identify the considerations which determine the matters that can
appropriately be bound in multilateral trade rules and enforced by the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Understanding. But, as I show, the literature is not conclusive. I also discuss the
implications of these five hypotheses for the likelihood that, at some future date, similar
proposals can be successfully advanced in the multilateral trade arena.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly summarizes
the history of the Singapore issues since the creation of the WTO in 1995, including the
decisions taken by WTO members with respect to deliberations and possible negotiations on
the four associated areas of government policy. The third section introduces and evaluates
five hypotheses that might account for the fate of the Singapore issues. The fourth section
recapitulates the goal and contents of the paper, and some concluding remarks are offered.
II. A brief history of the Singapore issues since 19952
The purpose of this section is to describe the major decisions since the establishment of
the WTO in 1995 pertaining to the deliberations of the WTO membership on the Singapore
issues. The following account of these decisions, plus the circumstances that surround them,
may help the reader to judge better the veracity of the five hypotheses concerning the fate of
the Singapore issues that are described in the next section.
1 For different accounts of what happened at the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference, see Ahmed (2003), Hoekman
(2003), Khor (2003), and White & Case (2003).
2 An informative account of the treatment of the Singapore issues by the WTO membership through 2003 can be
found in Federal Trust (2003)
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It may be useful to start by noting that the range of matters that fell within the Single
Undertaking of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations was not completely
determined at its launch in November 2001. In different ways the legacy of the Uruguay
Round, the previous multilateral trade round concluded in 1993, was to influence the items
included in the Doha Round’s Single Undertaking. First, there was the built-in agenda of
(in the eyes of some WTO members) unfinished negotiations on agriculture and services
and these were rolled into the Doha Round. Second, many developing countries were keen
to see their concerns about the implementation of Uruguay Round agreements addressed
seriously by the WTO membership before or during the Doha Round.3 On top of this
were proposals, made principally by industrialized countries, to include negotiations on
multilateral disciplines on investment policy, competition law and enforcement, transparency
in government procurement practices, and trade facilitation.4 At the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Singapore in 1996 it was decided to set up three working groups to address
the first three of these matters and to ask the Council for Trade in Goods to examine the
merits of further WTO disciplines on trade facilitation. These deliberations were not to be
negotiations; a formal decision on whether to launch formal negotiations was to be taken
at a later date. Rather, these initiatives were supposed to acquaint WTO members with the
policies in question, to clarify existing multilateral disciplines (where appropriate), and to
examine potential WTO disciplines in these areas; in short, a pre-negotiating study phase—at
least, that was the hope of the proponents of the Singapore issues.
As a result of the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, the next major
decision on the Singapore issues took place at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November
2001. Rocked by the attacks on New York City and on the Pentagon, policy-makers around
the globe saw the need to demonstrate solidarity, and the opportunity was taken to launch a
round of multilateral trade negotiations. The launch was not smooth because some developing
countries insisted that a ‘development agenda’ be adopted for what was to become known as
the Doha Round and that it was premature to launch formal negotiations on the Singapore
issues. Some deft diplomatic footwork resulted in a Ministerial Declaration which stated that
WTO members had decided to launch negotiations on each of the four Singapore issues;
however, the modalities (international trade-speak for the precise terms) of the negotiations
would be determined at the next WTO Ministerial Conference (that was to take place in
Cancu´n, Mexico). The relevant bodies at the WTO deliberating on the Singapore issues were
particularly active between the Doha and Cancu´n Ministerial Conferences (see SECO and
Evenett, 2003). In Table 1 I have listed the additional multilateral disciplines sought by the
major proponents of each Singapore Issue. The European Communities and its member states
(EC) were proponents of each Singapore issue.5 Korea and Japan supported negotiations
3 For some time, several developing countries argued that it would be inappropriate to launch the Doha Round
before the implementation matters arising from the Uruguay Round were resolved.
4 During the period 1995–9, certain industrialized countries argued for multilateral disciplines on labour standards
and on environmental policy to be negotiated. Developing countries were able successfully to resist negotiations of
the former, and negotiations on the latter were confined to a modest range of matters. In some literature, especially
that written before 1999 or dealing with the period up to 1999, the term ‘Singapore issues’ is used to refer to the
four government policy areas identified here in the main text plus the labour and environmental standards. After the
Seattle Ministerial Conference, the term Singapore issues was rarely used in official circles to refer to anything other
than the four areas of government policy identified in the main text.
5 The European Union (EU) is known for legal reasons as the European Communities in WTO matters. The
27 member states of the EU are WTO members in their own right. The European Commission speaks for all EU
member states at almost all WTO meetings.
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Table 1: Summary of leading proposals for additional multilateral disciplines in investment, competition,
transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation
Topic Leading proponent
of additional
disciplines
Additional disciplines sought
Trade and
investment
European
Communities
1. GATS approach (positive list) proposed for inclusion of sectors
for which the following proposed disciplines
2. Measures to improve transparency of national investment
regimes comparable to those in the GATS agreement
3. Extend applicable non-discrimination principles in the GATS
agreement to other forms of direct investment
4. Extend applicable pre-establishment disciplines in the GATS
agreement to other forms of direct investment
5. Inclusion of a balance-of-payments safeguard for developing
countries
6. Inclusion of ‘development provisions’ to provide cross-cutting
‘flexibilities’ across all horizontal disciplines outlined above
7. Definition of included investment includes all direct
investments where the investor owns 10 per cent or more of
the voting stock
8. All disciplines in this area subject to WTO dispute settlement
United States 1. Inclusion of portfolio investment flows (taken to include a broad
range of financial instruments) as well as direct investments in
any multilateral disciplines
2. WTO members should be as open to portfolio investments as
they are to direct investments
Trade and
competition
European
Communities
1. A commitment to adhere to a set of core principles
(transparency, non-discrimination, procedural fairness) in the
application of competition law
2. A commitment to enact and enforce a law against hard-core
cartels
3. The developments of modalities for voluntary cooperation on
competition law and policy matters between WTO members
4. A commitment to support the introduction and strengthening of
competition laws and related institutions in developing
countries
Transparency in
government
procurement
European
Communities
1. Measures on the following matters should be part of a
multilateral agreement: choice of procurement method;
providing information on national legislation and procedures;
publication of procurement opportunities and procedural
requirements; information supplied; time-limits for procurement
processes; decisions made on supplier qualification and
contract award; domestic review procedures; language used in
official documentation; and use of information technology
2. Measures to promote transparency including ensuring
information on procurement practices, rules and opportunities
are made widely available in an easily usable form to all
interested parties. Favoured a ‘principles-oriented’ approach
rather than prescriptive rules
3. Inclusion of a provision on technical assistance that mirrors the
language of Article 67 of the TRIPS agreement
(continued overleaf )
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Table 1: (Continued)
Topic Leading proponent
of additional
disciplines
Additional disciplines sought
Japan 1. Recognizing the difficulties that developing countries have with
the existing transparency provisions of the plurilateral
Agreement on Government Procurement, Japan argued for a
flexible approach based on core principles. The approach
would be legally binding and enforceable
2. The following measures would be covered by the agreement:
non-discrimination in transparency; definition and scope; core
transparency principles; domestic review procedures;
consultations and dispute settlement; technical assistance;
and special and differential treatment for developing countries
Korea 1. Measures on the following matters should be part of a
multilateral agreement: scope and definition (of covered
government procurement; measures to improve transparency
of procurement-related measures, award decisions, and
domestic review processes; exceptions; dispute settlement;
special and differential treatment; and technical assistance
2. All measures would be legally binding and subject to WTO
dispute settlement
United States 1. Measures to establish ‘core transparency elements’. It was
argued that these need not be specified ‘at this juncture’
2. Explicit conditions would be specified for when single
tendering by procuring bodies would be allowed and for
transparency associated with such single tendering
3. Commitments on independent review mechanisms that ensure
impartiality, that allow for rapid decisions including the
possibility of suspending the procurement process, and that
grant adequate remedies
4. Noted that disciplines on preference programmes were
explicitly precluded
Trade
facilitation
European
Communities
1. With respect to GATT Article V (Freedom of Transit), in
addition to measures to simplify, limit, and standardize
customs procedures and documentation requirements, the EC
proposed a broadening of National Treatment provisions on
modes of transport and provisions on technical assistance and
special and differential treatment for LDCs
2. With respect to GATT Article VIII (Fees and Formalities), the
EC suggested requiring the reduction in the incidence and
complexity of import and export formalities. Non-discrimination
across modes of transportation was sought, too. Provision for
special and differential treatment would be made
3. With respect to Article X (Publication and Administration of
Trade Regulations), the EC emphasized a commitment to
transparency through the publication of all relevant
information, the establishment of enquiry points for traders,
and procedures to make fast and advance rulings for traders.
Again, provisions on technical assistance and special and
differential treatment were sought
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Table 1: (Continued)
Topic Leading proponent
of additional
disciplines
Additional disciplines sought
Canada 1. With respect to GATT Article V (Freedom of Transit), in
addition to measures to simplify, limit, and standardize customs
procedures and documentation requirements, Canada
proposed a broadening of National Treatment provisions, but
only in so far as relates to internal taxation and the regulation
of goods. Envisaged support for technical assistance
2. With respect to GATT Article VIII (Fees and Formalities),
Canada recommended the standardization and compatibility of
data sets, with the eventual goal of furthering coordination of
procedures and formalities between customs agencies
3. With respect to GATT Article X (Publication and Administration
of Trade Regulations), Canada’s goal was to promote the
WTO principles of transparency, due process, integrity,
efficiency, simplification, and consultation. Rights to comment
on proposed trade rules on this matter, as well as rights to
appeal against administrative decisions, were proposed
Korea 1. With respect to GATT Article V (Freedom of Transit), in
addition to measures to simplify, limit, and standardize
customs procedures and documentation requirements, Korea
stressed cooperation and sharing of information among
customs authorities, harmonization of policies, standardization
and uniformity of datasets, and transparency. Provision for
technical assistance was envisaged
2. With respect to GATT Article VIII (Fees and Formalities),
Korea specifically argued for the use of accepted WTO/GATT
principles in interpreting matters relating to this Article
on these four matters, too, but often proposed different multilateral disciplines to those put
forward by the EC. The United States was particularly interested in negotiations on further
multilateral disciplines on national investment and government procurement policies. In this
respect, it is worth noting that for three of the four Singapore issues there exist already
binding multilateral disciplines; the latter provided some reference points for the discussions
among the WTO membership. For competition law and policy, there are some provisions in
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and in the Agreement on Trade-related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that refer to anti-competitive practices. Moreover, some
experts6 argued that the GATT’s national treatment disciplines already applied to competition
law and its enforcement, thereby linking proposals for further disciplines to one significant
principle in the WTO legal architecture. In sum, the extent to which the four Singapore issues
were ‘new’ to the multilateral trading system was debatable. Furthermore, as the observation
above about national treatment implies, the notion that these proposed disciplines took the
WTO ‘behind the border’ for the first time is extremely dubious.
The working-group processes proved to be inconclusive; no consensus emerged out of
any of them. Proponents of each Singapore Issue described in broad terms the multilateral
disciplines they were calling for. Opponents tended to regard the submission of legal text as
6 In particular Professor James Mathis.
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premature. Major decisions on Singapore-issues-related matters were typically taken by these
groups’ ministers, who rarely, if at all, attended the working groups. The inconclusive outcome
allowed WTO members to draw different, even potentially contradictory, conclusions about
the level of support for launching negotiations on these matters, and to take those disparate
conclusions with them to the subsequent Cancu´n Ministerial Conference. During 2003, groups
of developing-country trade ministers came together and, using different formulations, called
for the clarification process for the Singapore issues to be continued after the Cancu´n
Ministerial Conference, thereby rejecting the option of launching multilateral negotiations on
these matters.7 These declarations also called for further work to be completed on the trade
matters of particular interest to developing countries.
These deliberations on the Singapore issues did not proceed without reference to other
developments in the Doha Round (see Hoekman and Newfarmer, 2003). None of the
associated deadlines were met and frustration at the lack of progress in one area often led
to a slower pace, if not complete standstill, in others.8 Moreover, several matters further
exacerbated tensions between WTO members. First, developing countries criticized the two
draft Ministerial Declarations circulated before and during the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference
as not sufficiently reflecting their interests.9 This criticism is probably stronger in the case
of the second draft Ministerial Declaration. The first draft Ministerial Declaration (issued on
23 August 2003) contains almost identical and opposed text in square brackets (indicating
the absence of agreement); one part calling for negotiations on each Singapore issue to
begin, and the other for the process of clarification to continue. It is difficult to see how this
balanced, if inconclusive, formulation is biased. But the second draft Ministerial Declaration
(issued on 13 September 2003), however, explicitly called for negotiations to begin on trade
facilitation and on transparency in government procurement, to launch negotiations on trade
and investment matters no later than the date upon which WTO members agree to finalize
the modalities for negotiating agricultural and non-agricultural trade reform, and a proposal
to continue the clarification process on the interaction between trade and competition policy.
The second draft Ministerial Declaration is clearly at odds with the statements (noted above)
of a number of groups of developing countries on the Singapore issues. One could argue
that the proposed Ministerial Declaration was an attempt to find a compromise between
WTO members—if an ill-fated one. There were potential compromises closer to the stated
positions of developing countries and the fact that they were not chosen may well have been
a source of grievance.
The next source of friction concerned agricultural trade reform and the rejection by
a group of large developing countries (WTO members known collectively as the G-20)
of a compromise set of modalities proposed jointly by the EC and the USA. The WTO
membership had called on the EC and the USA to narrow their differences on agriculture
before the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference. The latter two parties sought to do this, but
on terms that the WTO membership rejected. The subsidization of cotton production was
the third item to sour relations between WTO members. Four very poor African countries
7 See, for example, the Declaration of Second LDC Trade Ministers, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 31 May–2 June 2003
(which 49 least-developed countries (LDCs) signed), the African Trade Ministers Meeting, Grand Baie, Mauritius,
19–20 June 2003 (which 53 nations attended), and a subsequent submission to the WTO by 12 developing countries
on 4 July 2003.
8 In this regard it is noteworthy that Ismail (2005) argued that insufficient progress towards a balanced outcome
had been made before the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference. Ambassador Ismail represents South Africa at the WTO,
a post he has held for much of the Doha Round.
9 The comments of one senior Bangladeshi trade diplomat on this matter can be found in Ahmed (2003).
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complained that these subsidies were depressing the world price of cotton and adversely
affecting the livelihood of many of their citizens, and demanded action on the part of the
principal subsidiser of this product, namely the United States. This demand was not expected
and came as a surprise to most WTO members and observers. The reaction from the US
delegation to such requests was to encourage diversification of the four African economies
concerned, rather than offering to cut or even contemplate cutting the subsidies in question.
This response met with indignation from many developing-country diplomats. In the light
of these considerations (missed deadlines indicating few or no satisfactory trade-offs made
across negotiating items; rejection of the US–EC agricultural compromise; the rejection of
the second draft Ministerial Declaration; and the mishandling of the cotton subsidies matter)
it is not terribly surprising that the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference ended without agreement
among the WTO members.
The prominence of the Singapore issues in the breakdown is precisely because, even
though it was the first topic to be discussed in the Green Room,10 WTO members could not
come to an agreement over which Singapore issues to launch negotiations on, after which
the Chairman decided to conclude the Ministerial Conference without agreement.11 Towards
the end of the deliberations, the European Commissioner for Trade offered to drop two
of the four Singapore issues, whereas the ACP group of developing countries insisted that
negotiations could not begin on any of them. Korea and Japan were said to have demanded
that negotiations start on all four issues, even after the EC’s concession. Rather than move
on to the second and third items that the Chairman had identified for discussion in the Green
Room (namely, agricultural trade and trade in industrial products) and possibly returning to
the Singapore issues should progress be made in other areas, Luis Debrez, the then Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, chose to conclude the Ministerial Conference. This decision
either reveals much about Mr Debrez’s judgement or much about the perceived willingness
of the WTO membership at that time to make trade-offs across diverse negotiating items.
The fate of the Singapore issues in the Doha Round was formally sealed in the WTO
General Council at the beginning of August 2004. The ‘July 2004 package’ was assembled to
put the Doha Round negotiations back ‘on track’, if not on schedule. WTO members decided
to stop for the duration of the Doha Round all work on the interaction between trade and
investment policies, the interaction between trade and competition policy, and transparency
in government procurement. It was agreed to launch negotiations on further trade-facilitation
measures. This set of decisions was necessary as there was no clear guidance in previous
Ministerial Declarations on how to treat the Singapore issues after the Cancu´n Ministerial
Conference.
Having charted the manner in which the Singapore issues entered WTO deliberations and,
for the time being, how only one Issue remains part of the WTO’s work programme, I now
turn to describing and assessing five hypotheses that individually or in combination may
account for the fate of the Singapore issues in the early years of the Doha Round.
10 The Green Room is WTO-speak for the place where negotiations occur between a subset of WTO members
typically invited by the WTO Director General. Formally, agreements made in the Green Room are not sufficient to
become WTO agreements. The entire WTO membership must agree before the latter can occur.
11 Interestingly, observers as diverse as Pascal Lamy, then Commissioner of Trade for the EC, and Martin Khor (of
the Third World Network) blamed the collapse of the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference on the WTO’s decision-making
procedures and not on the Singapore issues (see Lamy, 2003; Khor, 2003). It may be revealing that in hindsight it
has been very difficult to find articles about this Ministerial Conference that argue that the Singapore issues were the
sole cause, or even the most important cause, of the collapse. Sandrey (2006) is an exception.
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III. Five hypotheses concerning the fate of the Singapore
issues
The goal here is to understand better why negotiations on the four Singapore issues were
not launched in the early years of the Doha Round. Thinking through the reasons for the
demise of the Singapore issues is not just of interest for understanding the contemporary
trade policy record, it may have implications should a nation or group of nations seek to raise
these matters at the WTO in the future. If the reasons for the rejection of the Singapore issues
were Doha-Round-specific or otherwise context-specific, then those reasons may not apply
in the future. If, on the other hand, features fundamental to the world trading system are
incompatible with core elements of the Singapore issues, then the Doha Round experience
could cast a long shadow over the future scope of the WTO’s rules.
The five hypotheses concerning the fate of the Singapore issues can be succinctly described
as (i) wrong tactics, (ii) wrong proponent, (iii) wrong timing, (iv) wrong proposals, and
(v) wrong institution. In the remainder of this section I describe and evaluate each hypothesis
in turn.
(i) Wrong tactics
The thrust of this hypothesis is that, while the Singapore issues may have been consistent
with WTO principles and practice, and the proposals advanced by the proponents provided a
sound foundation upon which to negotiate multilateral disciplines, the tactics of the EC, the
principal proponent, left much to be desired. The first argument in support of this hypothesis
is that it was a mistake for the EC to insist that the four Singapore issues be considered
together for inclusion in the Single Undertaking. But it is not apparent why the four sets of
proposals for additional multilateral rules formed a coherent package and, therefore, why
they needed to be subject to a single decision by WTO members.12 Indeed, the EC often
made the case for each Singapore Issue without reference to the other three Singapore issues
under consideration by the WTO membership.13 Worse, the absence of any substantive and
well-articulated rationale for combining all four Singapore issues may have given rise to the
impression that the EC’s approach is this respect was entirely tactical. Moreover, the EC’s
wish to have the package of Singapore issues considered together may have strengthened the
perception that there was direct trade-off with other elements of the Doha Round negotiating
agenda. If the EC sought to create that impression, then arguably over time it proved more
counterproductive as the perceived lack of progress on other matters of interest to developing
countries, before and during the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference, may have made it easier for
the ACP nations to reject negotiations on all four Singapore issues.
12 It does not follow that supporting a case for the inclusion of each Singapore issue in the Single Understanding
must imply supporting the case for bundling all four issues together into a single decision concerning inclusion.
13 Quite a distinct criticism concerns whether the EC sufficiently demonstrated some of the linkages across some of
the Singapore issues or exploited those linkages in making its case to the WTO membership. For example, so many
contemporary foreign direct investments are in fact cross-border mergers and acquisitions. A coherent package of
measures concerning the overseas expansion of firms would need to take into account considerations of investment
policy (pre- and post-establishment) and competition law and its enforcement (in particular, the law on mergers and
acquisitions).
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The timing of the subsequent decision by the EC to consider differentiated outcomes for
the Singapore issues and the eventual decision to propose dropping two of these issues from
the Doha Round’s Single Undertaking was considered by certain observers as too little, too
late to save the few Singapore issues that some believe did have the requisite support among
the WTO membership to launch multilateral negotiations (White & Case, 2003). If the EC
had hoped that progress in other areas of the Doha Round would make the other WTO
members amenable to launching negotiations on all four of the Singapore issues, then the
sequence of missed deadlines in the run-up to the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference might have
suggested that the prospects of agreeing modalities had diminished, in which case an earlier
concession (whereby negotiations were launched for some issues and the others remained in
‘study mode’) might have yielded a better outcome than that which came to pass.14 White
& Case (2003), for example, in their report on the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference, contend
that as early as the Seattle Ministerial Conference there was enough support among the
WTO membership to launch negotiations on multilateral disciplines on trade facilitation and
transparency in government procurement. (The latter point need not be true to sustain the
original point that the EC’s concessions were too little, too late.)
Another tactical consideration concerned the arguments the EC tried to use to persuade its
trading partners of the merits of the Singapore issues. Up until 1999, by and large, the EC
argued that there were market-access-related benefits to multilateral disciplines on each of
the four Singapore issues. From 1999 the EC changed tack and officials argued that the four
Singapore issues were of generic interest to members of the WTO, including to developing
countries, and that no WTO member should have to ‘pay for’ the inclusion of these beneficial
global rules. It was sometimes argued that the four Singapore issues would contribute to
‘harnessing globalization’ and to a more equitable sharing of its benefits, and therefore
negotiations on these matters should be supported by all because of their systemic value
(Lamy, 2004). This amounts to a departure from the traditional reciprocity-based approach
to trade negotiations and (in the minds of critics) conveniently absolved the demandeurs of
these rules of the need to ‘pay’ for their negotiating requests.
A further challenge to the argument that the Singapore issues were clearly of systemic
interest is that, if they really are of interest to developing countries, then why did so few poor
countries concur with this assessment during the pre-Cancu´n deliberation phase? Other than
a few positive statements from Costa Rica concerning multilateral rules on the interaction
between trade and competition policy, before the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference it is difficult
to find much developing-country support for even the principle of additional multilateral
rules in these four areas of government policy. Of course, it is possible that some developing
14 An implication of the missed deadlines before the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference is that, in effect, all of the
bargaining would have to take place at the Ministerial Conference. On this expectation the EC may have been
loath to make a proposal for differentiated treatment of the Singapore issues before this Ministerial Conference
began, because of fears that the associated concession would have been ‘pocketed’, that is, not reciprocated by other
WTO members. This observation indicates some of the difficulties in devising negotiating strategies when a series
of sequential negotiations on various components of a package are inconclusive and the associated deadlines are
missed, which in turn hardens the positions of some or all of the negotiating parties. Under these circumstances,
the subsequent Ministerial Conference is not where the loose ends of the negotiations are tied up (as might have
been envisaged), but the venue where the negotiations on all related matters effectively begin in earnest. This last
observation raises systemic questions about how best to organize a negotiation on a package with many different
elements, as well as questions about what the optimal negotiating strategy is for a major player in those negotiations.
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countries would not have minded the negotiation of these rules but felt that, in a reciprocity-
based negotiation, they would have had to offer something in return for making demands on
the Singapore issues.
Questions might also be raised about the choices that the proponents either agreed to
or acquiesced to in the organization of the discussions of the Singapore issues from 1996
onwards. As noted earlier, three of the Singapore issues were discussed in especially created
working groups. While, on the face of it, it is difficult to object to a process that allows
deliberation and discussion among WTO members, this does not imply that the working-
group process was not without its faults. One might wonder how much serious deliberation
of members’ positions really took place in an international organization where negotiation is
one of the primary functions and where each member knew that the deliberation process on
the Singapore issues was to be followed by a decision about whether to launch negotiations.
This raises the question of whether the discussions in the working groups were essentially
quasi-negotiations, hamstrung by the fac¸ade of deliberation. Another generic problem with
the working-group process was that it tended to engage middle-ranking officials whose
relationship to the real decision-makers (trade ministers and their most senior officials) was
not always apparent.
(ii) Wrong proponent
In a reciprocity-based process of trade negotiation the reception of a proposal is rarely
divorced from the identity of the proposer. The second hypothesis is that the Singapore
issues met their demise because the European Commission, its principal proponent, and some
other proponents (notably Japan and Korea) were not seen as credible demandeurs. Some
contended that the proposals for launching negotiations on the Singapore issues were no
more than a ruse to delay awkward negotiations on trade-policy matters on which the EC and
others would find it hard to make concessions, such as agriculture (Kol and Winters, 2004). In
the writings of other opponents to the Singapore issues there was the firmly held conviction
that the EC would not be willing to offer much in terms of market-access concessions
or domestic support for reform in agriculture in return for concluding agreements on the
Singapore issues. This perception—and, let us be frank, it is only a conjecture—may have
inadvertently been reinforced by the European Commission’s argument that the Singapore
issues were of systemic interest and that the proponents should not have to ‘pay for’ them
with concessions.15 Moreover, if an observer took the view that it is EU budgetary constraints
that principally determine the pace and extent of agricultural trade reform in Europe, then it
may not be unreasonable to conclude that the likely pay-off to agricultural exporters from
accepting multilateral disciplines on the Singapore issues would be limited.
(iii) Wrong timing
The third hypothesis essentially states that the fate of the Singapore issues in the Doha Round
was a product of timing and circumstance, in particular the perceived legacy of the Uruguay
Round. Just after the WTO was established, the EC (among others) sought to persuade its
15 The EC was clear, however, in stating that it would offer technical assistance to developing countries, should
additional multilateral disciplines be negotiated.
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trading partners of the value of new multilateral trade rules on certain matters (not just the
four government policies considered in this paper, but also those related to certain labour
standards and environmental policies). In retrospect, the timing of these proposals could not
have been worse. The widespread optimism in the mid-1990s about the prospects of the world
trading system, with its new international organization and dispute-settlement mechanism,
among Western trade negotiators, international trade lawyers, public international lawyers,
and, for that matter, quite a few international trade economists, did not resonate with other
(in particular developing-country) members of the international-trade-policy community.
This optimism was short-lived as the view took hold in some quarters that the Uruguay
Round was not as balanced or as beneficial as many had originally thought.16 Some contended
that the cost of implementing the Uruguay Round obligations for certain developing countries
might have substantially, if not entirely, consumed the benefits of the Round’s trade reforms
(see Finger (2007), in his contribution to this issue). Others argued that promises of technical
assistance and aid, allegedly made at the end of the Uruguay Round by industrialized
countries, were reneged upon. Another argument put forward was that the Uruguay Round’s
actual impact was such that developing countries bore high implementation costs (associated
with establishing and upgrading national regimes with regard to intellectual property rights,
product standards and testing, and the like) and that the greatest benefits for developing
countries were put off for 10 years (with the phase-out of the Multi-fibre Arrangement
(MFA)) or were contingent on completing negotiations of interest to poor countries (such as
agricultural reform) at some point in the future. Finally, some argued that the negotiation of
the TRIPS agreement in the Uruguay Round demonstrated that an agreed-upon negotiating
mandate that was initially narrow could be expanded substantially over time, ultimately to
the detriment of developing countries—or so this argument goes (Woolcock, 2003). Taken
together, these points amounted to a wide-ranging critique of the set of Uruguay Round
multilateral trade agreements, their effects, and the process by which they were negotiated.
The veracity of each and every element of the above critique of the Uruguay Round can be
contested. However, for the purposes of this paper, what is important is not what is true but
what was persuasive. Under this hypothesis, then, the die of the Singapore issues was almost
certainly cast soon after the completion of the Uruguay Round.
One potential variant on hypothesis three is to fuse it with hypothesis two. Bearing in mind
that the EC and the USA were largely responsible for jointly determining the outcome of the
Uruguay Round, and given that both wanted at least two of the Singapore issues to be part of
the Single Undertaking in the Doha Round, having blamed these Western trading powers for
their paltry benefits from the Uruguay Round and in the absence of any serious movement
on the so-called implementation matters, some developing countries may well have been
determined to deliver a bloody nose to the leading proponents of the Singapore issues. More
generally, the fate of the Singapore issues in the Doha Round could be seen as part of the rest
of the WTO membership reminding the two long-standing poles of the multilateral trading
system that their domination is over. On this view the Singapore issues are victims of history,
geopolitical changes, and institutional circumstance.
16 In my view this widespread change in view is worthy of its own objective intellectual history. It would be
useful to learn what evidence persuaded trade analysts to change their view and then evaluate the soundness of that
evidence and the policy implications drawn from that evidence.
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(iv) Wrong proposals
In principle, the very proposals for additional multilateral obligations on the four Singapore
issues could alone provide grounds for opposition to launching negotiations. Here, the
concern is not that these matters should not be addressed in the WTO at all (that is the
subject of the next hypothesis), rather that the proposals themselves are deficient in some
way and therefore should not provide the basis of a multilateral negotiation. In the run-up
to the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference, some analysts, trade negotiators, and even ministers
criticized the content of the proponents’ proposals.17 (Indeed, Evenett and Hoekman (2005),
the first draft of which was written before the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference, contained
criticisms of the EC’s proposals to limit negotiations on additional multilateral disciplines
on government procurement to transparency-related matters.) A balanced assessment of the
proponents’ proposals would require a detailed account of those proposals, the extant and
relevant economic and development literature, and other pertinent considerations (see SECO
and Evenett, 2003). Here, however, I comment on the principal generic criticisms of the
proponents’ proposals. Readers should not infer that, because a criticism is described below,
that it is particularly well thought-through or, indeed, related to anything that was proposed
by the demandeurs of the Singapore issues. A claim does not have to be true to be persuasive
in policy circles.
The development mandate was also used to question the relevance of some proposals
to developing countries. In some critiques the implicit assumption seemed to be that every
proposal must be directly relevant to the well-being of developing countries. But why cannot
a package of proposals contain some elements of interest to some WTO members and other
elements of interest to another group of WTO members (assuming that any adverse knock-on
effects of both elements do not eliminate the net benefit of the package’s expected impact)?
In such situations the overall assessment should be made on the expected impact of the entire
package, rather than on individual elements of the package.
A generic criticism of the Singapore issues was that they would encroach on the so-called
policy space of developing countries. It was argued that additional multilateral disciplines
in these four areas of government policy would prevent developing countries from taking
measures that would promote their development. Some went further and argued that this
encroachment on national policy autonomy would prevent poorer countries from pursuing
the same policies that industrialized countries had used in the past. This latter appeal to
parity relies on assumptions that industrial countries actually used the very same policy space
that the proponents of the Singapore issues apparently seek to preclude; that if such policy
space was used, it was effective; that no alternative allowable policy instruments of equal
effectiveness now exist; and that more effective policies to attain the stated development
goals have not been subsequently identified and successfully implemented. On my reading of
the literature, there has been little attempt to demonstrate that the latter assumptions hold true.
In Evenett (2003a) I examined whether the proposed binding disciplines on the enactment
and enforcement of so-called hard-core cartels and non-discrimination in the enforcement
of competition law would preclude the adoption by developing countries of government
measures that had made a non-trivial contribution to successful national development policies.
I reviewed the extensive literature on the use of ‘industrial policy’ by the governments of
17 I should add that before and since the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference there were few assessments of the
proponents’ proposals that made specific reference to the actual proposals advanced for multilateral disciplines,
which is unsatisfactory, if not outright bizarre.
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the fast-growing East-Asian economies (a literature incidentally written almost exclusively
by critics of free markets) and found, to my surprise, that these governments rarely resorted
to cartelization among domestic firms, forced mergers, or discriminatory enforcement of
competition law.18 To the extent that governments intervened to influence the degree
of rivalry among domestic firms, the evidence pointed to measures being adopted to
promote competition. This review cast doubt on the contention that the proposed multilateral
framework on competition policy would have slowed down or frustrated the so-called
East-Asian Miracle, and that this framework would prevent other developing countries from
adopting the policy mix that contributed to East Asia’s spectacular growth.
Moreover, it was acknowledged by proponents of a multilateral framework on competition
policy that WTO members could seek exceptions from any binding disciplines in the event
of a substantial clash between the proposed obligations and national development policy.
So, even if there was an encroachment on useful policy space, a solution that did not
undermine development prospects was envisaged. In the light of these arguments the notion
that proponents were trying to kick away the development ladder before poor countries could
scramble up it does not bear scrutiny, certainly not as far as the proposals for a multilateral
framework on competition policy are concerned. Furthermore, when one considers how
rarely, if ever, one hears of development success stories based on degrading a nation’s
trade facilitation infrastructure, on greater delays and costs at ports and airports, and on
non-transparent public-procurement policies, one wonders just how ridiculous is the claim
that the need to preserve the policy space of developing countries provides compelling
grounds to reject the Singapore issues.
A different criticism of the proposals advanced was that they were unlikely to deliver
substantial gains to WTO members (in particular developing countries) and, therefore, were
not a priority. In an ideal world this criticism would have been backed up by solid empirics
demonstrating that the implementation of the proposed multilateral disciplines associated
with Singapore issues would be likely to generate substantially fewer benefits than the
implementation of liberalizing commitments in agricultural trade, non-agricultural trade, or
services.19 I could find no study that contains any such comparison, let alone a systematic
comparison. Even if I could, given the repeated downward revisions over time in the gains
from the trade reforms in agriculture, industrial products, and services expected to flow
from the completion of the Doha Round,20 any ranking of national negotiating priorities
may well have been reversed over time. Moreover, even if the pre-Cancu´n proposals for the
Singapore issues were expected to yield less than successfully concluding agreements on
other elements in the Doha Round negotiating agenda, it does not automatically follow that
18 With the exception of Japan, most of the countries considered did not adopt competition laws until well into,
or after, their fast growth phases, so the finding that they did not apply their competition laws in a discriminatory
manner is not terribly surprising. Even so, it does serve as reminder that this form of discrimination could not have
been part of the policy mix that contributed to the fast growth phase.
19 If one really wanted to be difficult here, one could argue that this empirical comparison is not enough. To
demonstrate convincingly that under no plausible circumstances are the Singapore issues a priority for developing
countries, one would have to show that none of the set of potential multilateral disciplines delivers gains to developing
countries that are of the same order of magnitude as the expected benefits from trade reform in agricultural products,
industrial products, or services. Indeed, given that the negotiating agenda at the WTO is not confined to the last
three matters, one might compare the potential benefits from a Singapore issue favourably with the benefits likely to
follow from any new multilateral rules on antidumping, especially if it is correct to expect very little in terms of new
rules to restrict this form of contingent protection.
20 Readers may recall that the World Bank cut its estimates of the net benefits of completing the Doha Round
negotiation by 80 per cent over the 4-year period 2001–5.
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negotiations of the former should be rejected. Another perfectly legitimate response would
be to propose even more ambitious multilateral rules for the Singapore issues that delivered
greater expected gains. For some reason this logical possibility eluded the critics.
Further thought about the merits of criticisms concerning the priority that should be given
to the Singapore issues raises other considerations. Surely whether a negotiating matter is
a priority ought to depend on the feasibility of successfully concluding the negotiations, as
well as their likely economic impact. Many of the critics of the Singapore issues seem to
have downplayed their likely economic impact and, given subsequent events, overestimated
the likely effects of, and quite probably the likelihood of successfully negotiating, the
liberalization of goods trade, agriculture, and services. A proper analysis of negotiating
priorities ought to be transparent about the assumptions made in this regard and their
rationale.
Another factor that probably coloured assessments of negotiating priorities is that most
international trade economists are better informed about market-access-related matters than
about the relationships between trade policies and the various government policies often
referred to as ‘inside the border’. These analysts may have discounted what they do not know
or do not know so well, skewing their assessments against the Singapore issues. One reaction
to this argument is that the burden of proof lies with the proponents of additional multilateral
disciplines. This may well be a good tactical argument on the part of negotiators and
government officials, but it will not stand for purportedly independent scholars and analysts.
It could just as well be argued that those who produce scholarly and other assessments, whose
credibility derives from their perceived expertise and independence, have a duty to inform
themselves as much as possible. This, in turn, raised questions about the adequacy of the
empirical evidence on the Singapore issues to which I now turn.
In SECO and Evenett (2003), for each Singapore issue my colleagues and I identified the
empirical evidence cited by proponents of the Singapore issues and did our best to summarize
the relevant empirical economic literature. The degree to which proponents employed
empirical evidence varied, and some deficiencies were identified in this respect (especially
concerning some of the evidence used by the EC to advance its proposals for additional
multilateral rules on investment). The question arises as to whether there was an adequate
or minimum necessary empirical base upon which thoughtful advice to policy-makers could
be developed. In the case of the Singapore issues, there is room for some discomfort here,
and policy-making may well have got too far ahead of the body of available knowledge.
In considering the severity of this criticism, it is worth bearing in mind that survey after
survey shows (see, for example, Deardorff and Stern, 1998) that the empirical evidence on
the effects of non-tariff barriers and, most importantly for policy-making purposes, on the
effects of international trade disciplines on the impact of non-tariff barriers, is very thin on
the ground. The latter argument should not be seen as an excuse; more evidence on the
impact of the effects of the Singapore-issue-related trade provisions is needed, just as it is
needed in non-tariff barriers, service-sector regulatory barriers, etc. Rather, the point is that
the Singapore issues are not particularly unusual in this respect and should not be singled out
for extraordinary criticism.
(v) Wrong institution
Among academics, perhaps the most interesting criticisms of the Singapore issues turned
on the contention that, even if there is a case for international collective action on a
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particular policy instrument or instruments, such an initiative should not be located within
the WTO—that is, within a multilateral trading system with binding rules and dispute
settlement. Essentially, these criticisms amounted to arguing that the proposed disciplines
fell outside the boundaries of the WTO. I argue below that the force of this criticism is
blunted once one takes on board the inconvenient fact that there is no widely accepted
formulation of what should constitute the boundaries of the WTO. In particular, I argue that
criteria based on economic considerations alone do not support a narrow set of boundaries
for the WTO.
First, however, let me set to one side some of the less thoughtful boundary-based
criticisms of the Singapore issues. Arguments that the policy instruments associated with
the Singapore issues were not trade-related are hard to square with, for example, the very
purpose of trade-facilitation measures. Arguments that the WTO should not go ‘beyond
the border’ are vitiated by the widespread acceptance of various multilateral disciplines on
national treatment, which are designed specifically to apply to policy instruments inside
the border. Arguments that the WTO should confine itself to cross-border trade in goods
and services ignore the fact that much international commerce takes place in or between
entities that do not involve products or persons crossing borders. Given that goods and
services transactions worth trillions of dollars are associated with the latter, a focus on
cross-border trade could call into question the WTO’s relevance in today’s highly integrated
world economy to a wide range of its members. I mention these objections to the Singapore
issues not because they should be taken that seriously, but rather because they explicitly or
implicitly underlie several of the critiques levelled at the proposals for additional multilateral
rules.
Ideally, a coherent set of principles would guide the determination of what disciplines
should be introduced into the WTO. Analysts have attempted to provide these principles (see
Maskus, 2002; Lloyd, 2005; Wolfe, 2007; and, in so far as it relates to plurilateral agreements,
Lawrence, 2006).21 I summarize their main arguments and their relevance for understanding
the opposition to the inclusion of the Singapore issues in the Single Undertaking of the Doha
Round.
Maskus (2002) accurately and succinctly summarizes the mainstream position of policy-
aware international trade economists, at least as I see it. He argues as follows:
Specifically, economists recognize four general principles when considering the need
for a negotiated set of multilateral disciplines to restrain government action or mandate
certain standards. First, are existing regulations . . . ‘trade related’ in the sense of
significantly distorting trade flows? Second, do those regulations impose externalities
on other countries that limit the attainment of global optimality and can multilateral
rules internalize those costs? Third, if left to unilateral action, do countries choose
policies that result in globally inadequate regulations, requiring policy coordination?
Fourth, is it possible to compute and assign damages from failing to comply with
international trade rules, thereby making dispute settlement a feasible task. (p. 136)
On the basis of his criteria and assessment of the evidence, Maskus concludes that, given
the TRIPS agreement, there is a strong case for including competition rules in the WTO. In
contrast, he finds that there is a weak case for including environmental policies, and an even
weaker case for including rules on labour standards in the WTO.
21 My own rather feeble effort in this regard can be found in Evenett (2003b).
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With respect to Maskus’s criteria, let me begin by noting that only his first two criteria
relate to economic considerations; the third criterion concerns policy choice and is as much
(if not more) a matter of political economy or political science than economics, and his
fourth criterion is essentially legal in nature. To the extent that the third and fourth criteria
bite—that is, they narrow the set of allowable multilateral disciplines—then in Maskus’s
schema economic considerations alone cannot settle this important policy matter.
My next point is that Maskus’s implied use of multilateral rules to foster the optimal
policy choice from the global perspective is very much motivated by the economist’s concern
with economic efficiency and resource allocation. Distributional considerations, development
considerations, legitimacy, other common values, etc., all of which were mentioned as
important factors in deliberations in the Doha Round on the Singapore issues, are not the
objectives being pursued in this schema.
Having said that, a focus on economic efficiency and resource allocation is broader than
only considering the consequences of government policy for the market access enjoyed by
trading partners. It is perfectly possible for a policy to create cross-border economic spillovers
without it constricting market access. The successful prosecution and break-up of a global
cartel by the competition enforcement agencies of the USA or the EC, which has happened
often in the past 15 years, can raise the welfare of trading partners without having implications
either way for market access. From a world welfare point of view, such prosecutions should
be encouraged. The fact that only the likely harm within a jurisdiction is used as an important
factor in determining the enforcement priorities of competition agencies suggests that some
globally valuable prosecutions may not be pursued. A case for international collective action
could be developed here without reference to market-access considerations. Such a case
would be consistent with Maskus’s mainstream economic principles, but, in the interests of
completeness and balance, I acknowledge that it may still fall foul of the two non-economic
criteria that he proposed.
The combined effect of the economic criteria described by Maskus is quite weak, in that
they only exclude from multilateral-trade rule-making those policies which do not influence
directly or indirectly international commercial flows, or, even if they do, have no adverse
spillovers on any trading partner. I contend that the policy instruments identified by the
proponents of the Singapore issues for binding multilateral disciplines would have passed
these two economic criteria. More restrictive trade-facilitation measures tend to reduce
imports from abroad, creating a direct spillover effect for those exporters not able to switch
overseas markets costlessly. Restrictions on foreign investment can have immediate cross-
border spillover effects on the profitability of foreign firms. Failure to enforce a national
cartel law can make a jurisdiction a safe haven for organizing regional or worldwide cartels,
creating adverse knock-on effects for the nation’s trading partners. Evidence about the cartel’s
formation and organization can be stored in the safe haven without the risk of seizure and
being sent to competition agencies abroad. Non-transparent public-procurement practices
can deter potential foreign firms from bidding for state contracts. In sum, the two economic
criteria advanced by Maskus—and recall that he believed he was summarizing mainstream
economic opinion—would not have provided a basis for rejecting the launch of the Singapore
issues at the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference.
Interestingly, when some trade economists have opposed the launch of negotiations on the
Singapore issues, they have tended to point to non-economic considerations to justify their
position. Whether they are qualified to make such claims in every instance is another matter,
but I leave that concern to one side. For example, Lloyd (2005) objected to the creation of a
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multilateral competition authority22 on the grounds that the object of WTO law should be a
WTO member and not a private party. This is essentially a legal argument concerning, in this
case, the prerequisites for enforcing a proposed multilateral rule.
In contrast to Maskus (2002), Lloyd (2005) and Lawrence (2006) both appeal to the
objectives specified in the Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization to develop
a distinct requirement that any new WTO rule (multilateral or plurilateral) should be
consistent with those objectives. Consequently, both argue that additional WTO rules that
reduce trade barriers, reduce discrimination in international commerce, and improve market
access are consistent with the objectives of the WTO. Lawrence (2006) also notes that
promoting development is another WTO objective. I have two comments to make about
these suggestions. First, with respect to the requirement to reduce trade barriers etc., to
the extent that this is a precondition then it will exclude forms of international cooperation
that meet Maskus’s first three principles; therefore, some initiatives to improve international
resource allocation would not be admitted to the WTO. Care is needed at this point in the
argument because, before condemning the narrowness of the requirement to reduce trade
barriers, discrimination in international commerce, etc., one ought to consider whether the
same initiative could not just as effectively be undertaken in some other international fora. If
so, then the benefits to the world economy of the forms of international cooperation excluded
from the WTO need not necessarily be lost.
Second, some proposals for international collective action may well meet Maskus’s
economics-related criteria, fail the requirement of reducing discrimination in international
commerce, yet satisfy the requirement of promoting development.23 What should be done
in this case? The difficulty arises from the fact that the WTO agreements contain more
than one distinct objective. Worse, since promoting development is such an objective and
development itself is often understood to be a multi-faceted phenomenon including both
non-economic as well as economic components, then the boundaries of the WTO as defined
by a development-promoting requirement may well be different from those associated with a
requirement to reduce discrimination in international commerce. For these reasons, appeals
to scripture (WTO agreements) are not going to take this particular debate forward very far.
A potential deficiency in the criteria proposed by Maskus is that they do not consider
the political pre-requisites to support multilateral rule formation both nationally and within
the WTO. For sure, Maskus’s third criterion concerns the political-economy factors that
account—from a global perspective—for sub-optimal national policy choice. Here, Wolfe
(2007), from a political-science perspective, provides some useful guidance. In his 11 criteria
for deciding whether to include matters in the WTO’s Single Undertaking he includes ‘it
should be possible to negotiate a multilateral modality that allows for variable geometry and
differentiation’ (p. 19), ‘negotiations must engage a transgovernmental network willing to see
the WTO as a focal point for their work’ (p. 19), and ‘new rules must also engage a group of
officials in each member who are able to see the relevance of the WTO’ (p. 20). These three
22 I will not dwell on the fact that the proponents of a multilateral framework on competition explicitly ruled out
the creation of such an agency and confined their actual proposals to disciplines on national competition law or,
where WTO members chose to cooperate in this fashion, regional competition law.
23 The proposal by the EC that each WTO member enact and enforce a national cartel law could meet a requirement
of promoting development because one of the forms of cartel is bid-rigging, where firms collude in the bids that
they make for state contracts. Developing-country governments are the targets of bid-rigging as submissions and
presentations at the OECD’s Global Fora on Competition have shown. School construction projects in China, for
example, have cost more than they should because of bid-rigging.
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requirements speak to the actors within and between WTO members who must, in Wolfe’s
view, support the negotiation of multilateral rules. I would note here the distinction between
what should be, what is, and what is likely to be. Wolfe’s three requirements seem more
appropriate for judging what measures are likely to garner enough support to be included in
the WTO. There could well be groups who, for whatever reasons, including the preservation
of existing privileges, powers, or autonomy, do not support the negotiation of multilateral
rules, even though an efficiency-based logic would suggest that such rules ought to be
negotiated and implemented. I do not regard this as a logical quibble. Some of the strongest
opposition to negotiating a multilateral framework on competition policy actually came from
the long-established competition agencies and the national and international competition
legal bar. In terms of what happened to that particular Singapore issue, the factors identified
in Wolfe’s analysis are useful in that they shed light on the matter at hand. However, I would
be careful about using these three of Wolfe’s criteria for purely normative purposes.
Perhaps appropriately, given the subject matter of this paper and his close involvement
in the deliberations over the Singapore issues, the last aspects of the ‘wrong institution’
hypothesis to be discussed here refer to the writings of Pascal Lamy. Contrasting Maskus’s
four criteria with the discussion in Lamy (2004) is both thought-provoking and instructive.
I start by noting that Lamy argued that there were fundamental lessons to be learned
from the collapse of the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference and that those lessons related to
the very purpose of the WTO and the proper form of international economic governance
more generally. Given the focus of this paper, one of Lamy’s most important arguments
is that economic efficiency is given far too much weight in discussions on the design of
international economic governance more generally and, by implication, of the WTO (p. 11).
In his view, ‘shared values’ and ‘legitimacy’ are also important ‘functions’ of international
economic governance (p. 12). Lamy, like Maskus, then includes non-economic considerations
in determining the boundaries of the WTO. Where the two views appear to be at odds is
over what those non-economic criteria should be. The extent of any tension would appear to
turn in large part on what constitute ‘shared values’ and ‘legitimacy’ and whether those two
considerations are additional criteria to be met by proposals for multilateral rules, or whether
they are substitutes for the efficiency-related criteria that economists put so much weight on.
In addition to their possible efficiency-enhancing effects mentioned earlier, plausible
arguments could be advanced which link the various proposals for binding multilateral
disciplines on the Singapore issues to certain interpretations of the ‘shared values’ and
‘legitimacy’ functions that Lamy sees for the WTO. If, for example, promoting and
preserving transparency were a shared value of the WTO membership, then proposals
to enhance the transparency in government procurement policies align nicely with that
function. Moreover, if it is argued that the legitimacy of international market integration
depends on the distribution of the gains from international commerce, then, to the extent
that greater inter-firm rivalry results in a broader distribution of benefits across customers
and producers, multilateral disciplines that encourage national and international measures
to tackle anti-competitive practices can be reconciled with the legitimacy function of the
WTO. Much turns on precisely what one wants the WTO to achieve. Indeed, given the
emphasis placed by many on promoting development in the Doha Round and by others who
prefer to stick to market-opening and liberalization, it might be worth considering whether
disagreements over matters as fundamental as what its members really want the WTO to
accomplish implicitly underlie the discord and tortuous negotiations witnessed over the past
6 years. If this is the case, then the disagreements over the Singapore issues, controversial
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matters such as Special and Differential Treatment, etc., may just be manifestations of a more
serious rupture.
The purpose of this sub-section has been to highlight the lack of any agreed guidelines as to
what policy instruments should be included within the boundaries of the WTO. It is not that
analysts have shied away from devising such guidelines, rather that they are unsatisfactory
in some respects or are at odds with one another. The notion that proposals for additional
multilateral rules on the Singapore issues fell foul of some generally accepted principles for
what should or should not be included in the WTO is incorrect.
IV. Concluding remarks
There were sharp disagreements between WTO members on the treatment of the four
Singapore issues at the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference. The goal of this paper is to understand
why this disagreement arose, bearing in mind that many factors may have contributed. In
an attempt to specify, clarify, and examine the importance of different potential causes I
have identified five distinct hypotheses: the five ‘wrongs’ being ‘wrong tactics’, ‘wrong
proponent’, ‘wrong timing’, ‘wrong proposals’, and ‘wrong institution’. Understanding the
relative importance of each hypothesis, as well as the merits of the criticisms levelled against
the Singapore issues, may well shed light not just on the fate of these issues in the Doha
Round, but also on the prospects for including them in the WTO in the future.
Although criticisms of the Singapore issues associated with all five hypotheses can be
found in the public record and literature on these matters, I would argue that the first
three hypotheses have the greatest explanatory power. Tactical mis-steps by the European
Commission, the legacy of the Uruguay Round, plus a willingness by poorer WTO members
to stand up to both the European Commission and United States, for the most part account
for the fate of the Singapore issues. Perceptions about the outcomes of the Uruguay Round
emboldened many developing countries and analysts and contributed to the demise of three
of these issues, even though I find the substance and the inferences drawn from the associated
criticisms of the Uruguay Round wanting in many fundamental respects. Criticisms of the
actual proposals advanced by the proponents of the Singapore issues and the argument that
they should not be part of the WTO (the ‘wrong institution’ hypothesis) were certainly part of
the rhetoric heard in the early years of the Doha Round, but I have serious doubts that these
technocratic matters were ultimately that influential. A caveat here is that, in principle, senior
trade policy-makers could have privately considered the details of these technocratic matters
and decided on this basis to oppose the Singapore issues, but explained their opposition in
very different terms. Once we know more about the internal deliberations of trade ministries
during the Doha Round, we can revisit this subject matter; in the meantime I stick to the
above assessment.
If this assessment is correct, then it does not rule out the eventual return, albeit almost
certainly in a different form and potentially under different circumstances, of the Singapore
issues. The WTO remains the leading reference point (as Lamy (2004) puts it) of international
economic governance, not just because of the WTO’s wide range of existing binding
disciplines, but also because of its dispute-settlement mechanism. After being bloodied
and bruised during the Doha Round, it would not be surprising if the EC and the USA
refrained from advancing the next set of proposals for multilateral rules on some, or all, of
the Singapore issues. This is not to say these two trading powers will not seek to include
provisions on the Singapore issues in the free trade agreements (FTAs) that they negotiate.
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Indeed, the EC is proposing to do just that in a forthcoming set of FTA negotiations and
both the EC and USA have sought such disciplines in the past in FTAs. Quite separately,
the experience with provisions relating to the Singapore issues in FTAs could provide an
important source of information and insights of potential relevance to future initiatives in
the multilateral trading arena. Capitalizing on the proliferation of FTAs and their growing
tendency to go ‘behind the border’ may call for some type of mechanism or initiative to keep
track of these developments and to consider their implications for the efficacy, design, and
implementation of multilateral trade rules in these areas. Augmenting the WTO’s surveillance
and analytical functions in this respect could eventually yield valuable insights for the entire
WTO membership.
If future initiatives on the Singapore issues are less likely to come from the Western
trading powers, then which WTO members could be their demandeurs? With their fast-
growing overseas interests, whether through trade or foreign direct investment, including
cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the like, the emerging poles of the world trading
system (specifically Brazil, China, India, and, upon its accession to the WTO, Russia) may
well find that numerous behind-the-border measures of their trading partners, and not just
those associated with the Singapore issues, have a greater adverse effect on their firms’ and
national interests than is currently recognized.24 Proposals for additional multilateral rules
could well follow. As these proposals are unlikely to incorporate uncritically the standards
of industrialized countries, any subsequent debate on such proposals may well avoid some
of the development-related pitfalls that befell the four Singapore issues in the run-up to the
Cancu´n Ministerial Conference.
The account of the fifth hypothesis (‘wrong institution’) also revealed a number of
first-order matters that warrant further attention by scholars and trade-policy analysts in
general. More work on refining sets of criteria for the inclusion of matters into the Single
Undertaking of a multilateral trade round is certainly needed. We still do not have a
compelling conception, let alone conceptions, of what should constitute the boundaries of
the WTO. Without this we ought not to be surprised if long-standing grievances, geopolitical
considerations, and tactics (perhaps unduly) influence the trajectory of the WTO! Thinking
through what permutations of objectives and associated criteria might mean for the WTO’s
boundaries would be particularly instructive now that the WTO membership has added
promoting development to its traditional goal of reducing discrimination in international
commerce.
However, the discussion of the fifth hypothesis implies that there is a more fundamental
task before international trade scholars, analysts, and diplomats: establishing precisely what
the WTO’s members want of it, or should want of it, would help clarify the objectives and
functions of the WTO. Some prefer economic efficiency (or improved resource allocation)
as the overriding objective; others put weight on matters such as enhancing legitimacy,
advancing shared values, promoting development, and the like. The consequences of each
objective, the relationship between objectives, as well as the coherence of any set of objectives
could be explored further. Such inquiry would be of systemic value in its own right, as well as
having implications for what should constitute the boundaries of the WTO. Finally, although
the fate of the Singapore issues in the early years of the Doha Round did not turn explicitly on
disagreements over these matters of the first order, should the central objectives and functions
24 Further thoughts in this regard can be found in Evenett (2007), together with some statistics and quotations from
leading policy-makers from some of the rising trading powers that suggest that officials are beginning to see that
certain Singapore issues merit greater attention in their national trade policies.
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of the multilateral trading system be thoroughly examined in the years to come, then not only
might we have a better sense of what the boundaries of the WTO could or should be, but the
contents and prospects of future attempts to expand the remit of binding multilateral rules
may be influenced as well. This is not to say that tactics, geopolitical considerations, timing,
and the specifics of proposals for new multilateral rules will not matter; rather, that there is
more room for deliberations on the changes in the scope of the WTO to be informed by a
clearer conception of the very purpose of the multilateral trading system.
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